For example, federal gift tax regulations complement federal estate tax regulations. Both are pari materia and should be read together, as gift tax regulations were enacted to prevent tax evasion of inheritance tax. Note: It is a doctrine in legal construction that laws that are pari materia must be interpreted together. The doctrine of pari materia is a useful tool for interpreting laws that serve the same purpose. It is a common rule of statutory interpretation that, where there is uncertainty as to their meaning, the terms of a statute must be understood in the sense that they are most consistent with the purpose of the text and the purpose that Parliament sees. The doctrine helps to harmonize the object and purpose of legislation. It is a doctrine in the legal construction that laws that are in pari materia must be interpreted together. That doctrine thus provides that any regulation relating, inter alia, to the system of labour regulation or taxation may be relied on to interpret legislation of the same category. In some cases, the Court has used this doctrine to infer the meaning of certain terms not defined in the law in question. However, caution should be exercised when importing word meanings from other laws. If a word is not defined in the law itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries or similar laws to know in what sense that word is understood. However, when choosing a word from the different meanings, context must always be taken into account, as it is a basic rule that “the meanings of words and phrases used in a law must take their color from the context in which they appear”.
Therefore, “when the context makes the meaning of a word clear enough, it becomes useless to search for and select a particular meaning among the different meanings of which a word is capable, according to lexicographers.” In J.K. Steal Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors, the Supreme Court, taking into account the parimeraria provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, held that acts which are in parimateria are to be considered together as a code and as the interpretation and application of the other. Referring to its earlier judgment in C.A. Abraham v. I.T.O., Kottayam It has been stated that “the Court of Justice, when interpreting a tax law, cannot remedy any deficiency; the Court of Justice must interpret the law in its present form and, in case of doubt, in a manner favourable to the taxable person. However, in J.K. Steel, supra, the majority did not accept the contention that a listing in the Excise Duty Act could be interpreted by reference to a similar entry in the Customs Act, which was equivalent to the Excise Duty Act. Justice Sirki, who delivered the majority judgment, observed: “I do not understand how the insertion of item 63(36) in the First Schedule to the Customs Act or the subsequent amendment of the Indian Customs Act, 1934 by the Indian Customs Tariff (Amendment) Act, 1963 clarifies the interpretation of Section 26AA(i).” Hegde J.A., representing the dissenting opinion, appears to have relied on two important factors present in this case, namely that both references were included in the statutes on the same day and that the circumstances showed that they were included for a common purpose. Another important aspect of such an interpretation is that the social aspect of the legislation is also taken into account before acts are considered parity. Laws such as the Upper Limits Act and the Rent Act, which have been implemented with the aim of implementing different socio-economic plans, must be read in a complementary manner. Any interpretation to the contrary may give rise to contradictions and it would be impossible to achieve the objectives set by the legislation.
It is therefore necessary to adopt a constructive attitude in the interpretation of such provisions and to define the main objective of the act concerned for the decision before the Court. Similarly, another Maharashtra Act of 1971 on the recognition of trade unions and the prevention of unfair labour practices should be read in conjunction with other labour laws such as the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, as they sought to achieve the same socio-legal aspect of workers` welfare. In Employees State Insurance Corporation, Madras v. S.M. Sriramulu Naidu, it was held that this doctrine could not be used to say that the Factories Act and the Public Insurance for Workers Act are in parimateria even though they were enacted in the same year and both were intended to benefit employees. The Court noted that the Factories Act is essentially concerned with regulating the factory in the interest and safety of the worker, a person employed in the manufacturing process or related work. The Factories Act was essentially concerned with the regulation of the factory in the interest and safety of the worker, a person employed in the manufacturing process or related work. Therefore, the two could not be treated as belonging to the same gender. Referring to the Heydon case, the Court stated: “For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (whether criminal or useful, limiting themselves to the extension of the common law), there are four things to recognize and consider.
What is the common law before the law was passed? What were the absurdities and flaws for which the common law was not intended? What remedy has Parliament decided and designated to cure the disease of the community? The real reason for the remedy. And then it is the task of all judges to always make a construction that suppresses evil and advances the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and excuses for the continuation of evil and pro privatocommodo, and to give strength and life to healing and remedy, according to the true intention of the authors of the pro bono publico law. In RCI Power Limited v. Union of India, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh referred to the case of J.K. Steel and held that the Reform Act, the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, the Electricity Act and the Supply Act were related laws and that the State Commission established under the Central Act had the power to determine the tariff payable for the use of transmission facilities by the generating undertaking in the manner provided for in section 29 of that Act. In Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Narasimhan, it was observed that: “It seems to us that even if section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 had not applied the provisions of the Penal Code and had not defined the public servant, the provisions of the Penal Code would have come into force by implicit reference because the Act was a complementary law to the Penal Code. It is only with great caution that the definition of the term “civil servant” mentioned in article 21 of the Criminal Code has been included in article 2 of the Act, and only in this sense can the law be treated as parimateria with the Criminal Code. For these reasons, therefore, we clearly believe that the High Court`s judgment that the defendant was not a public servant is vitiated by an error of law and cannot be accepted. In Shah & Co., Bombay v.
The State of Maharashtra and the NRA, the Rent Act and the Requisitions Act were not considered ancillary as the Rent Act was enacted to amend and consolidate the Rent Control and Repairs of Certain Premises Act, Hotel and Housing Prices and Evictions. The Requisitions Act was enacted to provide for the seizure of land, the continued seizure of land and certain other purposes. It will therefore appear that this law deals with a completely different matter from that of the Rent Act. There is absolutely no similarity between the two regulations; and we cannot claim that the Applications Act refers to the same person or thing or class of persons or things as the Tenancies Act.